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ATTORNEYS--DISBARMENT-NO IMmUNITY FROM PREvIous COMPULSORY SEU'-
CM imNATIom.-In a criminal trial an attorney had given testimony which
amounted to a confession of professional misconduct In subsequent disbar-
ment proceedings based on such misconduct, he claimed immunity by force of
section 584 of N. Y. Penal Code which provides, in substance, that no person
shall be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture on account of anything concerning
which he may have been compelled to testify. Held, that the statutory immunity
from penalties and forfeitures did not prevent disbarment as disbarment is
not punishment but revocation of a privilege conditioned upon honorable pro-
fessional conduct In re Rouss (1917, N. Y.) x16 N. F. 782.
In construing this section of the code in its application to disbarment pro-
ceedings, the case seems to be one of first impression; and the high plane upon
which the court places its jurisdiction to disbar is worthy of note. Cf. Beckner
v. Commonwealth (19o7) 126 Ky. 318, IO3 S. W. 378.
ATTo NEYs-PRAcrIcE DURING SUSPENSION AS CONTEP.-By order of the
Supreme Court each of the defendants was suspended from "practice in all
the courts of this state" for one year. During the year they kept open an
office, displayed the usual signs indicating that the office was a law office and
that they were attorneys at law, used and sent through the mails stationery
indicating that they were attorneys, and permitted their names to appear as
attorneys in the city and telephone directories. Held, that these acts constituted
contempt of court Roberts, J., dissenting. State v. Marron (1917, N. M.)
167 Pac. 9.
CAnams-Houns OF SERvicE AcT-C MPuTING TN.--The Hours of Service
Act (U. S. Comp. St x9i6, sec., 8678) forbids keeping certain telegraph operators
on duty for more "than 9 hours in any 24 hour period." An operator whose
regular day was 7 A. X,. to 4 P. IL., on one occasion worked from 7 A. ML. to
1.30 P. m., was off duty till 3 P. mL., then worked till 5.1o P. mL. and next day
resumed his regular schedule of 7 A. ML. to 4 P. ML. Thus he worked more than
9 hours out of the 24 hour period beginning at 3 P. xL. but not more than 9 hours
out of any 24 hour period beginning at 7 A. M. Held, that the Act was not
violated, since in fairness to the Railway Company the 24 hour period should be
construed to begin at the time the employee first goes on duty for his day's .work.
United States v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (z917, C. C. A. 8th) 244 Fed. 38.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROcESs-PoHmITmON OF MANUFACtURE oF
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.-The defendant was charged with violating a Washington
statute which provided that it should be unlawful for any person to manufacture,
sell, barter, exchange, or give away any intoxicating liquor. His offence con-
sisted in making "grape wine" exclusively for his own personal use. Held, that
this was an offense prohibited by the statute and that the statute, so construed,
was constitutional. State v. Fabbri (z917, Wash.) 167 Pac. 133.
This case seems to be the first actually holding it constitutional to forbid the
manufacture of liquor for personal use. It is supported by a dictum of Mr.
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Justice Harlan in Mugler v. Kansas 0887) 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct 273. A few
recent cases presentuig closely similar questions follow this dictum. In re Crane
(I915) 27 Idaho 671, 151 Pac. zoo6 (having in possession) ; Clark Distillery Co. v.
Western Maryland R. R. Co. (1916) 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct. i8o (transporting
in interstate commerce). There are many cases to the contrary, holding that the
mere possession and use of liquor to satisfy one's own personal tastes, and by
inference, at least, the manufacture of liquor for such use, is not injurious to the
public health, morals, or welfare and therefore is not subject to the police
power. Commonwealth v. Campbell (igog) 133 Ky. 50, 117 S. W. 383; Ridge v.
Bessemer (igog) 164 Ala. 599, 5I So. 246; Shreveport v. Hill (1913) I34 La.
351, 64 So. 137.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE PowER-ORDINANCE FoRBIDDIxa ADVERTISING ON
WALLs AND BuImmiNrs.-Under a municipal ordinance construed as prohibiting
the painting of advertising signs on walls and buildings within the city, a fine
was imposed upon the plaintiff in error. Held, that the ordinance, so construed,
was unconstitutional, as it constituted taking private property for public use -with-
out compensation. Anderson v. Shackelford (1917, Fla.) 76 So. 343.,
The case illustrates the persistence of the view of -the courts that the police
power does not extend to .the prohibition of practices which merely violate
aesthetic taste. See.Freund, Police Power, sec. 182; see also Henry T. Terry,
The Constitutionality of Statutes Forbidding Advertising Signs on Property
(914) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL I.
Couxrs-JURISDIcTIoN-VIEW IN FOREIGN STATE.-In a divorce proceeding tried
without jury, a view of premises located in another state was taken by the judge
in the presence of both parties and without exception by the appellant. On
appeal from a decree dismissing the complaint the appellant contended that the
court had acted without jurisdiction in taking such view. Held, that the court
did not exceed its jurisdiction since the action of the court corresponded to
the taking of a view by a jury, which is regularly done in the absence of the
court, and does not require the exercise of judicial functions at the time the
view is taken. Carpenter v. Carpenter (1917, N. H.) ioi Att. 628.
The case is noteworthy for its thorough consideration of the nature of a
view, as well as for the unusual circumstance that the view was taken outside
the state. Cf. State v. Hawthorn (19r4) 134 La. 979, 64 So. 873.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-AGREEMENT PENDING DIVORCE TO REsUME MARITAL
RELATIoNs.-During the pendency of divorce proceedings an agreement was made
between the parties by which it was provided that they should resume marital
relations, that certain community property should be divided, that the wife
should dismiss her suit, and that if the husband should thereafter do any act
giving her ground for divorce he should thereupon pay her $3,0oo. Subsequently
the wife obtained a divorce for misconduct and sued upon the contract, which
the husband contended was against public policy and void. Held, that the con-
tract was valid. Bowden v. Bowden (1917, Cal.) 67 Pac. 154.
The court draws the valid distinction between contracts which tend to encour-
age marital misconduct (as when one of the spouses agrees, should the other
give ground for divorce, to accept a certain sum in lieu of such alimony as a
court might award) and contracts which tend to deter from misconduct, like
the one under review, where neither party gave up any marital rights, but the
husband assumed, in addition to his marital duties, the obligation to pay some-
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'thing additional to what the court would award in a suit for divorce or separate
maintenance.
INHERITANcE AND TRANSFER TAXEs - ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT - OpTIoN
UNDER WILL TO TAE.. PAYMENT IN SEcuRiTis.-The widow of a decedent was
entitled under an antenuptial agreement to receive on her husband's death
$25o,ooo as a debt against his estate. By his will he confirmed this agreement
and provided that the wife should have the option of taking payment in securi-
ties to be selected by her from his estate instead of cash. She exercised this
option and accepted securities in payment Under an inheritance tax act, passed
after the antenuptial agreement and expressly not applicable to transfers by
"deed, grant or gift" prior to the act, a tax was assessed on the value of the
securities so transferred to -the widow. Held, that though by the antenuptial
agreement the widow became a creditor of the estate for $25ooo, and payment
of this debt in cash would not have been a taxable transfer, the option to take
securities was a legacy in payment of a debt, and as such, if accepted, was
equally taxable with gratuitous legacies. Hill v. Treasurer (1917, Mass.) II6
N. E. 5o9.
NUISANCE-PuBLIC GARAGE IN RESIDENTIAL DIsTRIcr-INJuNCTIoN2-An
injunction was asked against the, proposed erection of a garage in a district
exclusively residential, near large churches, on the ground that the operation
of a garage would necessarily create noises, odors and dangers, interfere with
church services, reduce the value of surrounding property, and increase insurance
rates. Held, that the injunction should issue. Prendergast v. Walls (1917, Pa.)
ior Atl. 826.
For cases denying injunctions against the operation of a garage see Sherman
v. Levingston (igio) 128 N. Y. Supp. 58I, 137 App. Div. 929 (not a nuisance
per se) ; Diocese of Trenton v. Toman (i9o8, Ch.) 74 N. J. Eq. 7o2, 7o Atl. 6o6
(garage near day nursery); Stein v. Lyon (19o4) 87 N. Y. Supp. 125, gr App.
Div. 593 (residential district). No previous case has been found in which the
operation or erection of a garage was enjoined as a nuisance, though an
injunction has been issued against the storage of gasolene in a frame garage
surrounded on three sides by other frame buildings. O'Hara v.,Nelson (19o6,
Ch.) 7I N. J. Eq. 629, 63 At. 842.
PATENTS-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-PRIcE RESTRICTIONS ON RESALE OF PATENTED
ARTIcLE.-Ford automobiles constructed under various patents were marketed
under a so-called "license system" by which dealers agreed to resell only at the
plaintiff's' full list prices. The defendants induced Ford dealers to break their
agreements, ahd Ford machines were advertised for sale by the defendants at
less than list prices. The plaintiff sought an injunction. Held, that the plaintiff's
contract with dealers amounted to an absolute, as distinguished -from a condi-
tional, sale of its patented machines and that after such sale attempted price
restrictions as to resale were invalid, both at common law and under the
Sherman Act. Ford Motor Co. v. Union Motor Sales Co. (1917, C. C. A. 6th.)
244 Fed. i56.
For a discussion of the principles involved, see (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL
6oo. See also F. Granville Munson, Control of Patented and Copyrighted
Articles after Sale, ibid. 27o. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Beni. E. Boone (1917,
C. C. A. 9th) 243 Fed. 335; and Robt. H. Ingersoll & Bros. v. Hohne & Co.
(1917, N. J. Ch.) io0 Atl..i030.
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PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-FOREIGN PRINCIPATL--PERsONAL LIABILITY OF AGENT.-
The defendants, Liverpool wool brokers, entered into a written contract in behalf
of an American firm with the plaintiffs who were Liverpool merchants. The
contract recited that "our principals sell, through the agency of" the defendants,
certain specified goods to the plaintiffs. The name of the principals was not
disclosed but they were referred to in the contract at the "seller." The contract
was signed: "By authority of our principals," followed by the name of the
defendant's firm and the words "as agents." In suit against the defendants for
breach of the contract it was claimed that by established custom of merchants
an agent contracting for a foreign principal assumes the liability of a principal.
Held, that if the alleged custom still existed, which was doubted, it was a
custom by which the agent was liable in place of, rather than in addition to,
the principal, and could not apply in the case at bar because inconsistent with
the language of the contract, which clearly made the foreign principal a con-
tracting party. Miller, Gibb & Co. v. Smith & Tyrer, Ltd. (C. A.) [1917] 2
K. B. 141.
The case is interesting as indicating a tendency to limit, if not to abandon, a
peculiar English doctrine, which, though originally founded on proof of custom,
at'one time seemed likely to be definitely adopted into the law. The authorities
are fully cited in the opinion.
TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-ALIMONY NOT INComE.-By a New York
decree of judicial separation entered in 1909 the husband was ordered to pay
the wife $3,o0o monthly during her life, and such payments were made during
the years 1913 and 1914. Held, that such monthly payments did not constitute
income ivithin the meaning of the Federal Income Tax law of Oct. 3, 1913 (38
Stat. 114, i66) and were not taxable thereunder. Gould v. Gould (Nov. 19, 1917)
U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, No. 41.
TELEGRAPHs AND TELEPHONES-REASONABLE SERvicE-DuTy To FURNISH
CUSTOMER CHANGE-The plaintiff claimed damages for the refusal of the
defendant telegraph company to accept a message for transmission. The message
was refused because the operator was unable to change a five dollar'bill tendered
by the plaintiff. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover on the ground
that a public service corporation must be prepared to furnish change to a
reasonable amount, and that reasonableness with reference to amount, time and
place was for the court to determine. Lehman, J., dissenting. Dale v. Western
Tel. Co. (1917, App. T.) 166 N. Y. Supp. 74o.
The case applies to telegraph companies, apparently for the first time, a rule
which seems to be well settled with reference to the duty of common carriers.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-RIGHT TO COMPENSATION-EFFECT OF SuBSE-
QUENT INSANITY-A workman sustained injury which caused permanent partial
incapacity and entitled him to weekly payments under the Massachusetts Work-
men's Compensation Act. Subsequently he became insane, his insanity being
in no way related to the injury. Held, that he was entitled to continue to receive
such weekly payments. In re Walsh (1917, Mass.) ix6 N. E. 496.
The court follows English cases which hold that a subsequent disqualification
for work, unrelated to the original injury, does not deprive a workman of the
compensation to which he is entitled for such injury. It is believed that this
is the first American authority on the point.
